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I. INTRODUCTION
The inexpensive, rapid, and massive copying possibilities that
digital technologies and the Internet make available have brought is-
sues of enforcement of copyright and related intellectual property
rights into strong focus. Rightowners, of course, retain all of the rights
they have always had against infringers whom they can identify and
who are amenable to enforcement measures, such as litigation. The
infringers are often not so easy to find, however, so rightowners would
like to be able to engage the assistance of other participants in the
processes in which infringements are taking place. Most of the initial
focus was on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and website operators,
but recently banks, advertisers, and other participants in Internet
commerce have been the object of judicial and legislative attention
aimed at inducing greater responsibility on the part of these partici-
pants to uncover and prevent copyright infringement on the Internet.
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Governments, too, have been active in both civil and criminal
enforcement.
The fundamental question is the extent to which copyright
owners should be able to enlist the assistance of third parties or gov-
ernment in the enforcement of their rights under copyright law.1 In
the United States, a major “hook” for inducing private enforcement ac-
tivity by third parties is the notion of secondary liability: contributory
infringement and vicarious liability. Applying law from the analog
world, courts have developed a kind of “rule of reason” approach to
secondary liability, which is now partially codified and supplemented
in the case of ISPs by § 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act. Courts in other
countries, however, have addressed many of the same issues as the
U.S. courts and largely seem to be arriving at similar conclusions.
Courts everywhere are trying to balance the interests of content own-
ers in intellectual property rights enforcement against user interests
in matters like privacy, free expression, transparency in regulatory
processes, and third party interests in being free to adopt business
models with minimal interference from government. In that sense, we
are seeing something of an international “convergence” in the ap-
proach to third party liability. The question then arises, however, why
we are involved in this kind of policy balancing at all: How did it be-
come accepted that private third parties should be part of the copy-
right enforcement scheme?
II. BACKGROUND ON U.S. APPROACHES
United States law has long separated primary and secondary
copyright infringement.  Primary infringement occurs when the ac-
cused, without authorization, performs acts that lie within one of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.2 Secondary infringement is further
divided into contributory infringement and vicarious liability.3 Both
1 I refer herein often to copyright rights, but trademark rights too have been the
focus of judicial activity in some important cases. Other intellectual property
rights, such as those arising under trade secret or patent law, have yet to raise
most of the questions that we are seeing with respect to drafting third parties into
the intellectual property enforcement effort in the context of the internet.
2 These are the exclusive rights to make “copies” of the work, to produce deriva-
tive works based upon the protected work, and to publicly distribute, perform, and
display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5). In addition, § 106(6) gives a limited public
performance right for digital sound recordings.
3 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has introduced a third category of secon-
dary liability, generally known as “inducement.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935-37 (2005). Few object to finding liability
when the level of subjective encouragement of copyright infringement required for
inducement liability is demonstrated. Unless otherwise noted, I assume herein
that facts sufficient for an inducement liability holding are absent.
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require that there be a primary infringement by someone other than
the accused. A person is liable for contributory infringement if he has
knowledge of the primary infringing activity and, in light of that
knowledge, materially contributes to the primary infringement.4 A
person is vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to control the
primary infringer’s acts and receives a direct financial benefit from the
infringement.5 Courts attempting to apply these long-standing princi-
ples in the digital age have struggled both to distinguish between pri-
mary and secondary liability and to apply the various elements of
contributory infringement and vicarious liability to the facts before
them.
The seminal Internet case got no further than the District
Court for the Northern District of California, but it has served as the
model for most subsequent judicial interpretations and for the specific
statutory amendment that now constitutes section 512 of the Copy-
right Act. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communica-
tion Services, Inc.6 involved the unauthorized posting of copyright
protected materials to a digital bulletin board that was accessible via
the Internet. The primary infringer was one Erlich, whose Internet ac-
cess provider Klemesrud operated the bulletin board in question.
Klemesrud, in turn, connected to the Internet through Netcom, the
ISP.
The court first held that storage by the primary infringer of
uploaded copies on an ISP’s computer system was not a direct infringe-
ment by the ISP of the copyright owner’s exclusive right to make cop-
ies. Direct infringement of the reproduction right requires a volitional
act that is lacking where a defendant’s system is used by a third party
to create a copy.7 The court was worried that any other approach
“would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reason-
ably be controlled.”8 The question of who makes the infringing copy
when a customer uses the defendant’s system has arisen with some
frequency, and courts have uniformly followed Netcom in requiring a
degree of volitional activity9 for a finding of direct infringement.10
4 E.g., Gershwin Pub. Co. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
5 E.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.
1963).
6 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
7 Id. at 1369-70.
8 Id. at 1372.
9 E.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir.
2008); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2004).
10 The Netcom court also held that Netcom did not directly infringe the exclusive
rights of public distribution or display. Emphasizing that Netcom neither created
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The primary focus now, however, is on secondary liability, and
here again the Netcom case established the analytical framework. For
vicarious liability, the court concluded that Netcom’s right and ability
to control its downstream users, like Erlich and Klemesrud, involved
material issues of fact but that, in any event, Netcom’s policy of charg-
ing a fixed fee regardless of whether the material was copyright in-
fringing precluded a finding of direct financial benefit.11 This is
another point on which most, if not all, U.S. courts have concurred.
The trickiest issue in Netcom was that of contributory infringe-
ment. On the sub-issue of whether Netcom had knowledge of Erlich’s
infringement, the court concluded that notice from the copyright
owner at least raised a fact question of whether Netcom learned about
the infringing activities in time to do something about them. If that
was the case, Netcom could be liable contributorily because Netcom
always had control of its system. Moreover, Netcom’s participation in
the infringing activity would constitute a material contribution if the
facts showed that Netcom was “able to take simple measures to pre-
vent further damage to Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”12 Thus, after
Netcom, the contributory infringement question was whether the ISP
had received actual notice of specific infringing activity and was in a
position to take reasonable action to do something about it.
Logically, it is unclear how the simplicity or reasonableness of
the defendant’s actions to prevent infringement is related to the issue
of materiality. The importance of the ISP’s contribution to the infring-
ing activity seems independent of how easy or difficult it is for the ISP
to stop the infringement once it has knowledge. In such approaches we
see the growth of the law. The court could have said that the ISP’s
contribution is simply not material, much as the Ninth Circuit did
later with respect to the participation of credit card companies in pay-
ments schemes for copyright-infringing materials.13 This would leave
the ISP out of the copyright enforcement picture altogether. Or the
court could have held that supplying the means to copy and widely
nor controlled the content of the posting but only provided access to the internet,
the court concluded that it would not make sense to hold the ISP liable.  Netcom
did no more than what every other internet server does, and to hold Netcom liable
would expand the net of copyright infringement much too broadly. As a matter of
legal doctrine, the court held that where the system merely stores and passes the
information on as a conduit, the system does not “cause” the information to be
distributed or displayed. Rather, it is the infringing user of the system who causes
these effects and is the one who should be directly liable for copyright infringe-
ment. Consequently, the ISP was not a direct infringer of copyright. See Netcom
On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. at 1371.
11 Id. at 1376-77.
12 See generally id.
13 See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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distribute materials, some of which are known to be infringing, was
clearly material. This might make a good deal of sense in the abstract,
but could easily end up “holding the entire Internet liable,” throwing
out the baby of millions of perfectly valid Internet transactions with
the bath water of relatively few infringements. So, the court sought
and found a middle ground, namely, a requirement that the ISP with
knowledge take reasonable measures to stop the infringing activity. As
shown through most of the rest of this article, the court seems to have
struck a responsive chord, as both Congress and the courts have fol-
lowed closely.
Congress relied on the Netcom case to draft a much more pre-
cise, and complex, amendment to the Copyright Act to cover ISP liabil-
ity. Adopted in 1998 as part of the so-called “Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,” section 512 of the Copyright Act14 protects any ISP
that meets the conditions of one or more of the section’s four “safe
harbors” from liability for monetary damages for copyright infringe-
ments that take place using parts of the ISP’s system. The statute also
limits the availability of injunctive relief against ISPs who are immu-
nized from monetary liability under one of the safe harbors.15
Section 512 is a complex statutory provision, but its basic oper-
ation can be understood by breaking it down into its constituent
pieces.16 It begins, in subsections 512(a), (b), (c), and (d), with the four
safe harbors themselves, which apply, respectively, to (a) “conduit”
ISPs who connect customers to the Internet and make no permanent
copies or any selection of transmitted material or recipients, (b) ISPs
who “cache” or temporarily store material at their sites for increased
technological efficiency, (c) web hosts or bulletin board operators, such
as Klemesrud in the Netcom case, and (d) ISPs involved in providing
Internet links. Each subsection defines the types of activity that are
immunized from damages claims and the specific conditions that must
be met to qualify for each of those particular immunities. Several of
these safe harbors require the ISP to take affirmative action to disable
access to or remove infringing material of which it is given notice, and
section 512(g) permits ISPs to replace the material or re-enable access
to it upon receipt of an appropriate counter-notice affirming that the
material was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification. Sec-
tion 512(i) then sets additional conditions for eligibility that are appli-
cable to all four safe harbors, the most important of which requires
14 17 U.S.C. § 512.
15 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).
16 Dennis S. Karjala, Liability of Internet Service Providers under United States
Law, JURISPRUDENCIA, 2006, at 11.
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that ISPs implement a policy of terminating clients who are repeat
infringers.17 Other provisions supplement this basic structure.
Many cases have litigated the detailed provisions of section
512. Of primary interest here is the requirement under subsections
(b)-(d) that the ISP (A) not have actual knowledge of infringing mate-
rial, be unaware of facts from which infringing activity is apparent
(“red flag” knowledge), or, upon obtaining such knowledge, act expedi-
tiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material; (B) not
receive any financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing ac-
tivity; and (C) upon receiving notice of infringement, respond expedi-
tiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material. We can
think of this provision as a codification of Netcom’s conclusion that an
ISP would be contributorily liable if it had knowledge of infringing ac-
tivity and failed to take simple or reasonable steps to stop it. This is
important because the fundamental issue has appeared in trademark
cases, and liability has been asserted against actors in the Internet
commerce environment who are not ISPs. The issue has also arisen, of
course, in countries outside the United States. Section 512 only applies
to copyright claims against ISPs under U.S. law, whereas the general
principles of Netcom can be, and have been, applied more generally. In
all these instances, the fundamental issue is the degree to which we as
a society do and should compel third parties to contribute time, effort,
and money to the enforcement of intellectual property rights held by
content owners.
A. U.S. Copyright Cases under Section 51218
The Second Circuit in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube,
17 17 U.S.C. § 512.
18 For convenience, Section 512(c)(1) is set out here in its entirety:
(c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users.—
(1) In general.— A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the service provider, if the service provider—
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material;
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Inc.19 held that the statutory requirement to remove infringing mater-
ials upon learning of their existence at the site contemplated knowl-
edge of specific infringing material, because otherwise the ISP would
not know how to remove it.20 The Viacom court, indeed, found two in-
stances under section 512 in which the degree of specificity of the ISP’s
knowledge was at issue. The first was in section 512(c)(1)(A), which
provides a safe harbor if the ISP (i) lacks actual knowledge of the in-
fringing activity, (ii) lacks “red flag” knowledge of the infringing activ-
ity (that is, is unaware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent), or (iii) upon obtaining actual or “red flag” knowl-
edge, acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing
material.21 The court concluded that (A)(i)’s “actual knowledge” ele-
ment contemplated knowledge of specific infringing material.22
Viacom then argued that “red flag” knowledge under (A)(ii) did not re-
quire awareness of specific infringing activity, because if it did the pro-
vision would be superfluous. Under this reasoning, knowledge of
generalized infringing activity would disqualify the ISP from the pro-
tection of the safe harbor. The Second Circuit, however, thought that
losing the safe harbor upon the acquisition of only generalized knowl-
edge of infringing activity would contradict the plain meaning of the
statute, especially the removal requirement that kicks in once the ISP
has the requisite degree of knowledge.23 The difference between (A)(i)
and (A)(ii), according to the Second Circuit, was not in the specificity of
the knowledge but between an objective and subjective standard: If the
ISP is subjectively aware of the infringing activity under (A)(i), a re-
moval obligation is triggered under (A)(iii) regardless of whether the
content owner has sent a notice.24 On the other hand, (A)(ii) is an ob-
jective provision that looks to whether subjective awareness of the spe-
cific facts would have made the infringing activity “apparent” to a
reasonable person.25
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right
and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph
(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material
that is claimed to be infringing  or to be the subject of infringing
activity.,17 U.S.C.A § 512(c)(1)(West 2010)
19 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
20 Id. at 30-31.
21 Id. at 30.
22 Id. at 32.
23 See generally id.
24 Id. at 41.
25 Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 30-31.
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The second instance in which the degree of specificity of the
ISP’s knowledge is at issue under section 512 arises from section
512(c)(1)(B), which denies the safe harbor to an ISP that receives a
direct financial benefit from the infringing activity and that has the
“right and ability to control” such activity. This portion of the statutory
safe harbors verbally mimics the traditional common law standards
for vicarious liability, which include no knowledge requirement. The
Viacom court noted the theoretical difficulty posed by importing a spe-
cific knowledge requirement into the “right and ability to control” pro-
vision of section 512(c)(1)(B), in that such an approach would arguably
make that provision duplicative of the actual knowledge provision of
section 512(c)(1)(A).26 On the other hand, to treat “right and ability to
control” under the statute as a codification of the common law vicari-
ous liability rule (which does not require knowledge of specific infring-
ing activity, or even general knowledge that infringing activity is
taking place) results in an even greater problem, because the very abil-
ity to do what the statute requires once the ISP has actual knowledge
– that is, remove or disable access to the infringing material – is suffi-
cient to show liability under traditional vicarious liability law by show-
ing right and ability to control the activity. Thus, compliance with the
requirements for the safe harbor under section 512(c)(1)(A) and (C)
would deny the availability of the safe harbor under 512(c)(1)(B).
Because the safe harbor is available only when the require-
ments of each of its pieces, namely, 512(c)(1)(A), (B), and (C) are satis-
fied, the safe harbor would never be available where the elements of
traditional vicarious liability are shown. The Second Circuit did not
believe that this was the congressional intent and concluded that
“right and ability to control” under 512(c)(1)(B) “requires something
more than the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on
a service provider’s website.”27 The Second Circuit in Viacom declined
to set a specific knowledge standard, however; it remanded the case for
further consideration by the trial court of both the “right and ability to
control” prong and the “direct financial benefit” prong of section
512(c)(1)(B).28
26 Id. at 36.
27 Id. at 38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Actually, the Viacom court’s reasoning on this point ignores
the second prong of vicarious liability, namely, direct financial benefit. Even if
“right and ability to control” does not contain a knowledge element, many ISPs
would fall outside the reach of § 512(c)(1)(B), namely, those who charge customers
on a flat-rate basis regardless of the amount of use. It might arguably even exclude
those who charge on a per/bit basis, provided the charges are the same for all
materials sent, whether infringing or non-infringing.
28 The court suggested that monitoring for the purpose of giving instructions on
appearance and content as well as inducement of infringement might be the kind
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UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC29 in-
volved the use by consumers of the system of the defendant, Veoh Net-
works, to upload and share video files. Some of these user-uploaded
videos allegedly infringed UMG copyrights, and UMG asserted both
direct and contributory infringement against Veoh. Veoh claimed a de-
fense under section 512(c), the web host safe harbor, and the court first
held that the eligibility language “by reason of the storage [on the de-
fendant’s system] at the direction of a user” applied even where, as in
this case, the system not only stored exactly what was uploaded but
also automatically reformatted the submissions to make them more
accessible to others.30
UMG did not send any DMCA-compliant notices to Veoh,
which would have given Veoh the URL information about infringing
videos that would have made it easy for Veoh to take them down.31
Rather, UMG argued that Veoh had general knowledge that many of
the millions of videos available on its system contained copyright-pro-
tected material and were uploaded without authorization to the Veoh
system.32 This, UMG asserted, was “actual knowledge” of infringe-
ment under section 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and was also sufficient to raise a
“red flag” under section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) that infringing activity was
“apparent.” Because Veoh had not acted to remove such infringing
materials in the face of such purported actual or “red flag” knowledge,
as required by 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), it was not entitled to the benefit of the
safe harbor. In other words, UMG’s position was that general knowl-
edge of some level of infringement was sufficient to trigger an obliga-
tion on the part of the ISP to find the offending material and disable
access to it. The Ninth Circuit concluded that copyright owners were in
of “substantial influence” that could show a “right and ability to control.” Viacom
Int’l, Inc., supra note 19, at 38. A district court has interpreted “right and ability to
control” in section 512 as going beyond the mere technological ability to remove or
block access and requiring some participation like prescreening content, rendering
“extensive” content advice to users, or editing content. Wolk v. Kodak Imaging
Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (involving a photo-sharing
service allowing users to upload and share photographs and videos).
29 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.
2011), superseded UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, No. 09-
55902, slip opinion (9th Cir. March 14, 2013).  The superseding opinion was issued
after rehearing by the panel but does not change the analytical approaches
adopted by the court in its earlier opinion.  For purposes of this article, the pri-
mary change is to follow closely the Second Circuit’s decision in Viacom, if any-
thing heightening the case for convergence.
30 UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 09-55902 at 28.
31 Indeed, it seems that whenever Veoh did get a DMCA-compliant notice, it re-
moved the offending files. Id. at 28-29.
32 See id. at 29-30.
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a better position to identify infringing copies than ISPs, as evidenced
by the notice provisions of section 512, and therefore that general
knowledge that one’s system was being used to share infringing mater-
ials was insufficient to deny the benefit of the statutory safe harbor to
ISPs.33  The court placed emphasis on section 512(m), which forbids
statutory construction of the safe harbors as requiring ISP monitoring
of its system for infringing activity.34  The court also explicitly adopted
the Second Circuit’s distinction in Viacom between actual knowledge
in 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and “red flag” knowledge in (A)(ii):  (A)(i)’s actual
knowledge standard is subjective and is met when the ISP is subjec-
tively aware of specific infringing activity, while (A)(ii)’s “red flag”
knowledge simply requires subjective awareness of facts that would
make specific infringement apparent to a reasonable person.35
Veoh might still have been denied the safe harbor under sec-
tion 512(c) had it received a direct financial benefit from the infringing
activities (user uploads) and had the “right and ability to control” such
activities.36  As the Second Circuit concluded in Viacom,37 if the statu-
tory meaning is the same as the common law meaning, the safe harbor
would never be available whenever the ISP would be vicariously liable
under the common law test, because ISP agreements with users al-
ways give ISPs the legal right to police user activity.38 Disabling ac-
cess would in itself show the “ability to control,” so the very
requirement for protection of the safe harbor under (A)(iii) and (C)
would disqualify from the safe harbor under (B).39 The court believed
Congress intended the safe harbor to apply even where the traditional
elements of vicarious liability were present40 and went on to conclude,
following Viacom, that “right and ability to control” in the statute
means “something more” than general ability to locate infringing ma-
terial and terminate access.41
33 Id. at 31.
34 Id. at 32.
35 Id. at 39.
36 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
37 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 36-38 (2d Cir. 2012).
38 See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 104 (2007).
39 UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 09-55902 at 42-43.
40 Id. at 45-47.
41 Id. at 48. The court recognized that willful blindness – deliberate actions aimed
at avoiding specific knowledge of infringing activity – would count as “knowledge”
and deny the availability of the safe harbor. Id. at 34. Given the court’s conclusion
that the “right and ability to control” prong of vicarious liability was not satisfied,
because of the absence of proof that Veoh had specific knowledge of infringing ac-
tivity, the court did not address the other requirement of direct financial benefit.
Id. at 40, n.16.
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The important principle to be gleaned from the holdings of
Viacom and Shelter Capital is that secondary liability on both tradi-
tional branches – contributory infringement and vicarious liability –
requires knowledge of specific infringing activity and not merely gen-
eralized knowledge that some unidentified users have employed the
system in an unidentified way to infringe copyrights.42 The onus is on
the copyright owner to inform the system operator not only of the gen-
eral fact of infringement but also of specific information sufficient to
permit the ISP to take action to stop the infringement by denying ac-
cess to or disabling the infringing site. We might note that requiring
action by the ISP after receiving notice does place a nontrivial burden
on the ISP to participate in the enforcement of other people’s copyright
rights. It is, however, closely analogous to what we have long required
under secondary liability principles in the analog world of people who
are, in one way or another, connected to the activities of a copyright
infringer.
A recent district court decision hints at the kind and level of
surveillance courts may require of ISPs under section 512. In Capitol
Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC,43 the defendant operated a system
that allowed users to store music files in virtual lockers, from which
the files could be played by the user with any Internet-connected de-
vice. Users could upload files stored on their personal hard drives and
could transfer music files to their lockers from third party websites. A
second website operated by the defendant allowed users to search for
music files on the Internet and “sideload” such files into their individ-
ual lockers. Plaintiffs identified websites from which Defendant’s
users had sideloaded protected music files and gave section 512 com-
pliant notices to Defendant demanding the removal from users’ lockers
of the songs that had been sideloaded from the identified websites. Be-
cause Defendant kept track of the source and web address for each
sideloaded song, the court concluded the notice gave sufficient infor-
mation to permit finding the infringing music in individual lockers and
removing or disabling access to it. The court generalized by saying that
where ISPs allow the searching and storing of protected works in pri-
vate accounts, the ISPs must keep track of the source and web address
of stored protected material, and they must take down such content
upon receipt of a Section 512 compliant notice.44
42 It is perhaps worth noting that if the traditional law of vicarious liability were
to apply, not even the generalized knowledge of infringement on the defendant’s
system would be necessary to state a claim. Both Viacom and UMG vigorously
asserted such knowledge, perhaps because they sensed that a court would not be
sympathetic to what would otherwise amount to a strict liability claim.
43 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC , 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
44 See id. at 642-43. The court went on to hold that the safe harbor was available
to defendant for works stored on or linked to defendant’s system, other than works
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The U.S. cases under section 512 thus show continued viability
of the general approach in Netcom that ISPs must take reasonable
steps to avoid or reduce infringing activity using their facilities; how-
ever, there is no ongoing general obligation to patrol the system to dis-
cover and root out infringement of which the ISP is otherwise
unaware.45 Section 512 has added many technicalities to make the no-
tion of “reasonable steps” more precise. In most ways the statute has
been highly successful, but the basic, intuitive approach of the Netcom
court remains largely undisturbed.
B. U.S. Cases Outside of Section 512
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Association,46
the plaintiff sued various credit card companies for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement based on the processing of credit card
payments by customers of third party websites that offered infringing
copies of the plaintiff’s copyright-protected photographs. Because the
credit card companies did not qualify as ISPs under section 512,47 the
court applied the common law of secondary liability. Over a vigorous
dissent, the Ninth Circuit majority found no contributory infringement
because processing a credit card payment was not a material contribu-
tion to the actual infringing acts of reproducing and distributing the
protected photos.48 Similarly, the court found no vicarious liability be-
sideloaded from links identified in the takedown notices. Id. at 646. Defendant
was, however, held contributorily liable for failing to block user access to infring-
ing material in individual user lockers that had been identified in the notices. De-
fendant’s system made a substantial contribution to the infringement and the
notices gave actual knowledge of the infringement. Id. at 648-49.
45 See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Ninth Circuit did not reach the Section 512 issue but held that Google could
be held contributorily liable to Perfect 10 under general secondary liability law “if
it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search
engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s
copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.” Id.
46 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
47 An earlier case in the Ninth Circuit also raised the issue of liability of a credit-
card processor CCBill for handling payments relating to infringing photographs.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, section
512 was raised as a shield, and the Ninth Circuit remanded for a determination of
whether CCBill qualified as an ISP under section 512(a). The court concluded that
CCBill did not qualify under Section 512(d), because its services went far beyond
mere information location and linking, and the infringement claim was not for the
linking but for the processing of monetary payments. Id. at 1116-17.
48 Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d at 796. Because it found that defendants did not
make a material contribution to the infringement, the court did not reach the issue
of whether they had the requisite knowledge for contributory infringement. Id. at
795.
2013] CONVERGENCE ON THE NEED FOR THIRD PARTIES 201
cause while the credit card companies had the right and power to cut
off payments to operators of websites identified as infringers, they had
neither right nor power to control operation of the actual systems that
were used to effect the infringements by reproducing and distributing
the protected photos.49 While the arguments were necessarily set forth
in doctrinal terms, the court was clearly worried that a decision
against the credit card companies might have a drastic and negative
effect on Internet commerce: “We evaluate Perfect 10’s claims with an
awareness that credit cards serve as the primary engine of electronic
commerce and that Congress has determined it to be the ‘policy of the
United States (1) to promote the continued development of the In-
ternet and other interactive computer services and other interactive
media [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.’”50
It is clear, as Judge Kozinsky’s dissent in Visa repeatedly em-
phasizes,51 that cutting off payments to websites that are allegedly of-
fering infringing materials would likely help reduce the level of
infringing conduct on the Internet. It is also clear that processing
credit card payments makes a material contribution to concluding the
transaction (whether the deal is for infringing material or not), at least
in the sense that, but for the credit card payment, the transaction
likely would not occur at all. Further, the nature of Internet transac-
tions concerning photographs almost invariably means that the trans-
action itself involves multiple infringements (if unauthorized), as the
digital file moves from the server on which it is stored (probably ille-
gally), through multiple digital devices before ending up on the pur-
chaser’s hard drive. Nevertheless, the credit card companies have no
way of knowing whether any particular transaction involves infringing
material or, if it is infringing, whether the current plaintiffs are the
copyright owners. Their choice, therefore, is either to cut off a given
site’s transactions completely or to process all of them, despite know-
ing that some of the processed transactions allegedly involve infring-
ing materials. Framed this way, the issue is whether a third party
credit card company lacking knowledge that any specific transaction
49 Id. at 805. Having found that defendants lacked the right and ability to control
the infringing activities, the court did not reach the issue of whether the credit
card companies derived a direct financial benefit from the transactions. Id. at 806.
It would seem, however, that they did have such an interest, because they charge a
percentage of every transaction, so the more infringing transactions there are, the
more money they make. Indeed, the dissent pointed to allegations that the defend-
ants gave special treatment to the infringing sites because of the “unusual and
substantial profits” they earned from such transactions. Id. at 820.
50 Id. at 794 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1), (2)).
51 Id. at 810 (Kozinsky, J. dissenting).
202 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 12:2
involves infringing material must cut off all transactions with the al-
legedly infringing site, including those in which the complaining party
has no interest and including many that at least potentially are per-
fectly legitimate.
It is not surprising that the Visa case resulted in a deep divi-
sion on the three-judge panel that heard it. Suppose money-laundering
transactions are known to be going through a specific bank but there is
no way to identify which specific transactions are illegal and which
ones (presumably the majority) are not. Should a court, without legis-
lative authority, order another bank to stop all business with the first
bank – the one known to be used for money laundering? If this is prob-
lematic, it is even more so where the court order to stop doing business
with a particular website is aimed at protecting private commercial
interests, as in the case of infringing content.52 Selecting between (1)
allowing the payment processing for at least some infringing transac-
tions and (2) closing down a site completely and thereby eliminating
all transactions at that site going through that payment processor,
whether infringing or not, forced the Visa court to go a step beyond the
approach of Netcom. In Netcom, the ISP would have been liable had
there been sufficiently specific knowledge of infringing activity and
reasonable steps, which were available to the ISP, were not taken to
stop the infringing activity.53 Visa essentially says that shutting down
an entire site to protect copyright rights of a single copyright owner is
not a “reasonable step.”54
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,55 was a trademark case, outside
of section 512, that raised the same issue as the copyright cases dis-
52 The Ninth Circuit majority expressly worried about the slippery slope – other
providers of goods and services to businesses alleged to be copyright infringers,
such as electric power companies and software services. Id. at 800. Judge Kozin-
sky, in dissent, dismissed this fear saying that utilities have an obligation to de-
liver services independent of contract and that software services generally have no
contract that permits them to stop providing services on account of illegality. Id. at
821-22. Judge Kozinsky’s argument may be relevant to the “right and power to
control” prong of vicarious liability, although it would hardly seem to be determi-
native. It is wholly unconvincing on the “material contribution” prong of contribu-
tory infringement, because once either the power company or the software servicer
has notice of infringement, each makes a material contribution to that infringe-
ment by supplying indispensable elements to the system used to effect the
infringement.
53 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54 See Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 7886.
55 Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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cussed above.56 Here, the well-known online auction site eBay was
sued by the famous designer and seller of high-end jewelry and other
items, Tiffany’s, for contributory trademark infringement by failing to
stop allegedly widespread sales on the eBay site of counterfeit Tiffany
products.57 Given the absence of any statutory provision for contribu-
tory trademark infringement, the Second Circuit followed the Su-
preme Court’s test looking to whether the alleged infringer continued
to supply a product to a person who he knew or should have known
was engaging in trademark infringement.58 The evidence in the case
showed that eBay promptly removed challenged listings, but Tiffany
argued that eBay had knowledge that many listings not directly chal-
lenged also involved counterfeit Tiffany goods.  The Second Circuit
agreed with the district court that something beyond general knowl-
edge that the site was used to sell counterfeit goods was necessary for
eBay to be held liable for contributory infringement.59 The court noted,
but did not base its decision on, the incentives eBay already had to
make strong efforts to minimize counterfeit transactions on its auction
site. Many customers who purchased counterfeit goods complained to
eBay, so it was in eBay’s general interest to try to stop such activities.
Indeed, eBay spent millions of dollars in an effort to minimize counter-
feit transactions.60
III. NON-U.S. CASES
Cases from outside the United States, primarily Japan and the
European Union, provide a general idea of what appears to be a signif-
icant degree of convergence in judicial treatment of the basic problem.
The discussion herein, outside of Japan, Australia, and the United
Kingdom, is based on summaries of decisions that have appeared in
the literature.
56 For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Justin Nicholas Redman, Post Tif-
fany (NJ), Inc. V. eBay, Inc.: Establishing a Clear, Legal Standard for Online Auc-
tions, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 467 (2009).
57 Tiffany also alleged direct trademark infringement, but the sale of at least some
legitimate Tiffany goods on eBay was a noninfringing use of the Tiffany mark to
describe the goods accurately. Tiffany, supra note 55, at 101. eBay’s generalized
knowledge of some counterfeit sales was relevant only to the contributory infringe-
ment issue, because it was undisputed that eBay promptly removed all specific
listings that Tiffany challenged as counterfeit. Id. at 103.
58 Tiffany (NJ), supra note 55, at 103 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)). The Inwood Court would also find contributory infringe-
ment against one who intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark. In-
wood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854. That prong of Inwood was not at issue in Tiffany. Id.
at 104.
59 Id. at 107.
60 Id. at 109.
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A. Australia
The High Court of Australia in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v.
iiNet Ltd.61 faced the question of whether an ISP “authorised” copy-
right infringement by providing Internet connection services to cus-
tomers who used the BitTorrent P2P file sharing system to exchange
copyright protected films. While Australia has a statutory safe harbor
scheme similar to that of the United States,62 the defendant iiNet was
ineligible for its protection,63 so the court addressed the problem by
applying general copyright principles. Under the Australian statute,
the issue was whether the defendant had “authorised” the infringing
activity.64
Plaintiffs argued that iiNet’s technical and contractual rela-
tionships with its customers gave it indirect power to control the use of
its Internet connection services, that this power to control was
equivalent to “authorisation,” and that an injunction should issue re-
straining iiNet from continuing to provide Internet connection services
to each of some eleven specified accounts. The court framed the au-
thorization issue as involving subsidiary questions of whether iiNet
had the power to prevent the primary infringements and whether
iiNet took reasonable steps to prevent infringements after receiving
notice.65 At least on the surface, this analysis appears similar to that
of the Netcom court in the United States.
In the actual case, the Australian High Court concluded that
iiNet had limited power to prevent infringement, namely, indirectly by
terminating its contracts with infringing customers. Like the Visa
credit card case in the United States, the Australian court may have
deemed it excessive to shut down an entire site – including transac-
tions in which the current plaintiffs had no copyright interest and even
legitimate transactions — in the service of stopping a relatively small
number of specific infringements. On the “reasonable steps” prong of
the analysis, the High Court noted that a terminated account could
engage another ISP and continue with the infringing activity, and if
iiNet gave warnings it would be obliged to try to monitor the warned
customers, which itself would require a detailed technical involvement
with the BitTorrent technology.66 The court thus seemed to believe
that whatever iiNet did, it was unlikely to be effective. Moreover, the
61 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v. iiNet Ltd ., [2012] HCA 16, ¶ 4.
62 See generally Australian Copyright Act §§ 116AA - 116AJ; see Roadshow Films,
supra note 61, ¶ 25. The safe harbor limits remedies against ISPs but allows
courts to require the ISP to terminate a specified account. Id. ¶ 13.
63 Id.
64 Id. ¶ 5.
65 Id. ¶ 63.
66 Id. ¶ 73-74.
2013] CONVERGENCE ON THE NEED FOR THIRD PARTIES 205
High Court found some deficiencies in the notices of infringement that
iiNet had received.67 Therefore, the High Court dismissed the plain-
tiffs’ appeal.
B. Japan
In the Internet Mall Case,68 the operator of an Internet shop-
ping mall was sued for trademark infringement based on the unautho-
rized use of Plaintiff’s registered mark on various goods offered by one
of the virtual “stores” in Defendant’s mall. The lower court held that
the Internet mall operator was not a party (shutai) to the infringing
transactions between the store operator and his purchasing customers.
On that ground the lower court found no trademark infringement on
the part of the mall operator. The High Court did not directly address
the question of whether the mall operator was a party to the transac-
tions but said that the mall operator could be liable if, after getting
knowledge of specific infringing activity, he failed to act to shut down
or disable the site within a reasonable time. On the actual facts, the
mall operator was not liable because he did act within a reasonable
time after receiving notice.69
The High Court first noted that Internet shopping is a social
benefit and most transactions do not involve trademark infringement.
Moreover, the High Court reasoned, even where trademark rights are
involved, the store owner may be the rightowner, he may be author-
ized by the rightowner, or the item may be a parallel import, so the
fact that the item is available does not itself lead to a high probability
67 Id. ¶ 78.
68 Perfetti Van Melle S.p.A. v. Rakyten Corp., Heisei 22 (ne) No. 10076 (Tokyo
Intellectual Property High Court, Feb. 14, 2012). A brief summary of this case, in
English, may be found at Toshio Aritake, Japan IPR Court Holds Internet Shop-
ping Mall Liable for Infringement, 26 WIPR 23 (Feb. 2012). Unfortunately, this
report is not entirely accurate, because it states that the IPR court held both the
mall operator and the vendor (virtual “store”) liable whereas the lower court held
only the vendor liable. In fact, the vendor was not a party to the lawsuit and,
therefore, the holding of neither court reached the vendor, although the IPR court
did state in dictum that the vendor would be liable. Moreover, as discussed in the
text below, the IPR court found no liability of the mall operator on the actual facts
and overruled the lower court only to the extent of stating that the mall operator
could be liable if he did not act within a reasonable time after receiving notice of
the infringing activity.
69 Intellectual Property High Court Ruled That Internet Shopping Mall Operators
Can Be Found Liable for Trademark Infringement, ITOH INT’L PATENT OFFICE
(Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.itohpat.co.jp/e/ipnews/index.html. In this case, the
mall operator acted within 8 days or less after receiving notice, which the court
concluded was a reasonable time (without giving any more specific reasons). Id.
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that the store owner is infringing.70 Nevertheless, trademark infringe-
ment is also a crime under commercial law and regulations, so where
an ISP has concrete knowledge of trademark infringement by a store
operator, there is a possibility of contributory infringement.71 The In-
ternet mall operator also makes money from the store owner’s opera-
tions, and where the operator is aware of infringing activity at a
particular store, he has power under the contract with the store owner
to delete the content or block access to the page. Thus, when the mall
operator receives notice of infringement from a trademark owner, he
has an obligation to make an immediate investigation. To the extent
he fulfills this obligation, he is not liable for trademark infringement,
but if he neglects it he bears the same responsibility for infringement
as the storeowner.72 There seems to be no substantial difference be-
tween the approach of the Tokyo IP High Court here and that of the
U.S. Second Circuit in the eBay case, notwithstanding different statu-
tory language and jurisprudential history.
C. European Union
Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive73 seems to be quite sim-
ilar to section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act, discussed above. Articles
12-14 of Section 4 insulate service providers who act as “mere con-
duits,” engage in “caching,” or provide information storage services
(“hosting”), if the service provider complies with various conditions.74
The “hosting” safe harbor applies when the service provider lacks ac-
tual knowledge of infringing activity and is unaware of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent or, upon obtaining
such knowledge, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the information.75 Article 15 prohibits the establishment of a general
obligation on service providers to monitor information that they store
or transmit or actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal
activity.76 The Court of Justice of the European Union has interpreted
Article 15 to deny the demand of the Belgian copyright management
company SABAM that a social network install a filter system to moni-
tor all users for infringements of music and audiovisual works.77
70 See id.
71 See 2012 (ne) no.10076, supra note 68.
72 Id.
73 Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC).
74 Id. art. 12-14.
75 Id. art. 14.
76 Id. art. 15.
77 Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV., 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Feb. 16,
2012).
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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has also
interpreted much of this Directive in the context of alleged trademark
infringements on an online marketplace. L’Oreal SA v. eBay Interna-
tional AG78 involved much the same issue as the eBay case in the
United States and the Internet Mall case in Japan. L’Oreal contended
that eBay’s internal procedures for preventing trademark infringe-
ment by sellers at its auction site were insufficient and brought suit in
the United Kingdom when eBay did not respond satisfactorily to
L’Oreal’s demand to take stronger steps to prevent infringing activity.
The English High Court held against L’Oreal on the issue of joint
trademark infringement but referred that and other issues to the
CJEU.79
On eBay’s liability for infringing use of trademarks by sellers
on eBay’s site, the CJEU looked to the Directive. The court held that it
was the sellers and not eBay who made infringing use of the trade-
marks by displaying goods on the website, so the liability of eBay
would depend on the conditions of intermediary liability under the Di-
rective. This harkens back to the Netcom court’s refusal to hold the
ISP liable for primary copyright infringement based on the posting of
material by a customer. The CJEU interpreted Article 14, the “host-
ing” safe harbor, to apply only where the intermediary’s services were
provided “neutrally,” via technical and automatic processing. The in-
termediary would not fall within Article 14 if it had knowledge or con-
trol over the presentation or if it provided assistance to its sellers by,
for example, promoting or optimizing the sellers’ offers. Moreover,
even where Article 14 applies, the exemption is available by its terms
only where the intermediary lacks actual knowledge of the infringe-
ment or, having obtained such knowledge, acts expeditiously to re-
move or disable access to the infringing data. Notice from the
trademark owner is not conclusive on the knowledge issue, but it is a
factor, presumably an important factor, for courts to consider in deter-
mining whether the intermediary should have known of the infringing
activity.80
The L’Oreal case also addressed injunctions against ISPs
under the Enforcement Directive, Article 11, which states in part,
“Member states shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used
by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right.”81 The court
78 Case C-324/09, L’Oreal SA v. eBay International AG, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS  (July 12, 2011).
79 Among the issues were trademark exhaustion, liability for removal of packag-
ing materials, and the use of keyword advertising. Id.
80 Id.
81 Council Directive 2004/48, art. 11, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45 (EC).
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recognized that this provision was available against intermediaries
not only to correct past infringements but also to prevent future in-
fringements, but any such injunction must comport with Article 15 of
the E-Commerce Directive, which expressly prohibits establishing a
general obligation to monitor or to seek out facts indicating infringing
activity. The court suggested suspension of the accounts of known in-
fringers and orders making it easier to identify potentially infringing
sellers as examples that might strike a fair balance between various
rights and interests.
1. France
The French courts have already interpreted the L’Oreal stan-
dards and have come to apparently conflicting results for U.S. compa-
nies eBay and YouTube. In eBay Inc. v. LVMH,82 the highest French
court found that eBay played an active role in promoting various coun-
terfeit goods and therefore did not qualify for the safe harbor under the
E-Commerce Directive. While noting that eBay had knowledge and
control over the data stored at the auction site, it is not clear that eBay
actually knew that the data in question referred to infringing goods. If
such knowledge is not required in France, the French rule for ISPs
would be similar to the traditional U.S. rule for vicarious liability,
meaning that the safe harbors of the E-Commerce Directive are not
available against such claims. As noted above, the Second and Ninth
Circuits in the United States have expressly held that the section 512
safe harbors do apply, at least to some extent, even in the context of
traditional vicarious liability.83
On the other hand, in YouTube LLC v. TF1,84 a French televi-
sion broadcaster unsuccessfully sought liability from YouTube for the
posting by YouTube members of infringing content on the YouTube
site. Applying the L’Oreal standard of active participation, the court
concluded that YouTube simply employed a statistical algorithm to
rank videos in various categories, which is different from making a
conscious choice or playing an active role in determining the content of
the postings.85
It is not entirely clear how the YouTube and eBay cases in
France are to be distinguished. It is probably true that YouTube is
more automated because its primary purpose is to make videos availa-
82 Court of Cassation, May 3, 2012, c eBay. Louis Vuitton Malletier, JURISCOM.NET
(May 3, 2012), http://juriscom.net/2012/05/cour-de-cassation-3-mai-2012-ebay-c-
louis-vuitton-malletier/.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 34-57.
84 Tribunal de grand instance de Paris [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdic-
tion] Paris, 3e ch., May 29, 2012, No. 10/11205 (Fr.).
85 Id. at 24-25.
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ble, usually on a noncommercial basis. The commercial nature of eBay
necessarily pushes it more deeply into the sales transactions that take
place there. Still, it is not clear how eBay could determine which of the
millions of items that change hands on its site daily are in fact coun-
terfeit, at least without expenditure of a great deal of time and money
on monitoring. Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive says that such
monitoring cannot be demanded of ISPs, so the question is whether
eBay is different in any relevant respect from an ISP when it comes to
the monitoring issue.86
2. Germany
The German courts seem to be taking a position that requires
more of ISPs once they have notice of specific infringement. In GEMA
v. YouTube,87 the Hamburg Regional Court held that YouTube would
not be liable for copyright-infringing content at its website unless, af-
ter receiving notice, it did not take immediate action to block the in-
fringing videos. Had the court stopped there, its holding would be in
line with the cases we have discussed thus far. However, the court
went on to state that, once notice was received, YouTube was obligated
to take measures to prevent additional violations, while clarifying that
YouTube did not have an obligation to check all content on its site.
Similarly, the German Federal Court in Karlsruhe held that a website
operator does not have an obligation to check the content of an RSS
feed hosted on its site, where the content of the feed is automatically
published and its source identified.88 In this case, the court said that
the decisive factor was whether the website owner “adopted” the con-
tent, which could occur via editing the text or failing to clarify that the
content came from a third party.
In Atari v. RapidShare, the highest court in Germany, the
Bundesgerichtshof, affirmed the approach taken by the Hamburg Re-
gional Court.89 Atari sued RapidShare, a file hosting website, for copy-
right infringement based on the availability of infringing copies of
some Atari video games on the site. The BGH denied direct infringe-
ment by RapidShare, but concluded that RapidShare could be liable if,
once notified of the infringement, it failed to take sufficient measures
to prevent access to the infringing material and also to prevent its be-
86 85B. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,
supra note 73, art. 15.
87 Jabeen Bhatti, German Court Finds YouTube Responsible for Copyrighted Con-
tent When Given Notice, 17 ELEC. COM. & LAW REP. 755 (Apr. 25, 2012).
88 Jabeen Bhatti, Court Rules Operator Not Liable Third Party Content Hosted via
RSS Feed, 26 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 17 (July 1, 2012).
89 Jabeen Bhatti, Supreme Court Rules File Hosting Sites Must Do More to Pre-
vent Infringement, 26 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 14 (Sept. 1, 2012).
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ing uploaded again. The court suggested that RapidShare should have
used filters to prevent a repeat infringement of the particular works in
question and had a responsibility to search link collections on third
party sites for links to the illegal file. Because in both of these German
cases the requirement to take preventive measures seems to apply to
specific works, this obligation does not directly conflict with Article 15
of the E-Commerce Directive’s prohibition on general monitoring re-
quirements, but the obligation is more than has been required of ISPs
under section 512 by the U.S. courts.
3. United Kingdom
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunica-
tions PLC90 involved a suit by film studios against the United King-
dom’s largest ISP, British Telecommunications (BT), for copyright
infringement based on the unauthorized availability for download by
others of protected films at the site of one of BT’s customers,
Newzbin2. BT claimed protection as a “mere conduit” service provider
under Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive, as implemented in the
United Kingdom. The main issue in the case was the meaning of “ac-
tual knowledge” in the Directive and in the U.K. implementing regula-
tions. BT contended that liability required actual knowledge of a
specific infringement of a specific work by an identified individual.91
The court placed heavy reliance on the language of Article 8(3) of the
Information Society Directive,92 which is virtually identical to Article
11 of the E-Commerce Directive quoted above,93 as implemented in
section 97A of the U.K. statute.94 That provision allows injunctions to
issue against an ISP where the ISP has “actual knowledge of another
person using their service to infringe copyright.” It goes on to say that
the court determines actual knowledge on the basis of the particular
circumstances, including whether the ISP has received a notice of in-
fringement and the extent to which the notice provides “details of the
infringement in question.”95
The court noted that under the E-Commerce Directive, an ISP
with actual knowledge loses the benefit of the safe harbors of Articles
13 and 14, but this is not the case for “mere conduit” ISPs under Arti-
cle 12, which suggested that “actual knowledge” should not be inter-
90 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications PLC, [2011]
EWHC 1981 (Eng.).
91 Id. ¶ 116.
92 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 2001 O.J.
(L167).
93 See supra text accompanying note 81.
94 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (Eng.).
95 Id. c. 6, § 97A.
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preted too restrictively.96 Moreover, recital 59 of the Information
Society Directive states “[R]ightholders should have the possibility of
applying for an injunction against an intermediary who carries a third
party’s infringement. . ..” Inferring a similar purpose to section 97A of
the British statute implementing that part of the Directive, the court
found a legislative intent to allow injunctions against an ISP who “car-
ries” infringing material, because the ISP is best positioned to bring
the infringing activities to an end.97
Perhaps most importantly for the court was the language of the
statute in section 97A referring to “actual knowledge of another person
using their service to infringe copyright.” On the basis of this lan-
guage, the court distinguished between use of the service to infringe
from the infringements actually committed by such use.98 The court
concluded that, while “actual knowledge” can only be determined
based on all the facts and circumstances, it is “not essential to prove
actual knowledge of a specific infringement of a specific copyright work
by a specific individual.”99 Thus, BT had actual knowledge that third
parties were using its service to infringe.100 The court also determined
that it had the authority to grant the broad order sought by the film
studios, which required the blockage of the entire Newzbin2 site to
BT’s subscribers rather than simply ordering BT to ensure that the
specific content owned by the litigating studios was blocked.101
While the Twentieth Century Fox case in the United Kingdom
appears on the surface to accept a lower threshold for “actual knowl-
edge” than we have seen in the cases from the United States and other
countries, it is perhaps important to point out that the remedy sought
from BT was an injunction, not damages.102 Even under section 512 in
the United States, the DMCA safe harbor provisions apply largely to
damages remedies sought against the ISP. Section 512(j)(1)(B) applies
to the equivalent of “mere conduit” ISPs like BT, and limits injunctions
to orders restraining the ISP from providing access to a subscriber or
account holder who is using the service to infringe.103 Consequently,
the same broad order that was so fiercely contested in Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox would likely be available in the United States without much
discussion, assuming proof of similar facts.
96 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., [2011] EWHC 1981 at ¶ 145.
97 Id. ¶ 146.
98 Id. ¶ 147.
99 Id. ¶ 148.
100 Id. ¶ 157.
101 Id. ¶ 204.
102 Id. ¶ 1.
103 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (D.M.C.A.), § 512(b)(2)(E) (2012).
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IV. NEW STATUTORY SCHEMES
In May 2011, after several years of controversial and somewhat
opaque negotiations,104 the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA)105 was published. One of the ACTA drafters’ major
goals was to strengthen the weak enforcement requirements of
TRIPS.106 While it appears that ACTA will not be ratified, two of its
provisions seem relevant to the current discussion on the liability of
ISPs and other third parties for copyright infringement on the In-
ternet. Article 8(1) would have required each treaty party to insure
that “its judicial authorities have the authority to issue an order
against. . ., where appropriate, a third party. . . to prevent goods that
involve the infringement of an intellectual property right from enter-
ing into the channels of commerce.”
Article 12 requires similar judicial authority to order “prompt
and effective provisional measures” against a third party to prevent
infringement. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has criticized ACTA
on numerous grounds, one of which is that its language could be inter-
preted “to legitimize website filtering and blocking and Internet dis-
connection.”107 Article 12 of ACTA is surely susceptible to such an
interpretation, but as the treaty left much to the discretion of the indi-
vidual treaty parties, we cannot say with certainty that all or even
many would have gone as far as feared by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.
The United States had its own legislative battle on many of the
issues addressed by ACTA, the most widely discussed of which was
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).108 SOPA first would have given crimi-
nal enforcement authority to the Attorney General to go after foreign
sites that were directed at U.S. recipients, were violating the U.S.
criminal copyright or federal trade secret provisions, and would have
been subject to seizure were they U.S. sites.109 Section 103 of SOPA
focused on sites “dedicated to theft of U.S. property,” that is, sites di-
rected to users in the United States and designed primarily to infringe
104 See generally Hilary H. Lane, The Realities of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, 21 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 191-97 (2012) (describing interna-
tional protests and several controversial effects of the act).
105 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Act (ACTA), Oct. 1, 2011, available at http://www.
ustr.gov/acta (containing the text of the act).
106 Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 255
(2012). Professor Yu goes on to point out, however, that the ACTA obligations
would themselves have been difficult to enforce. Id. at 264-65.
107 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., available at
https://www.eff.org/issues/acta (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
108 Stop Online Piracy Act (S.O.P.A.), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
109 Id. § 102(a).
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U.S. copyright or trademark law.110 The interesting thing about the
civil provisions of SOPA in section 103 is that they were aimed at In-
ternet payment providers and advertisers.111 The evident goal of the
statute was to enlist the assistance of these third parties in the en-
forcement of private intellectual property rights. After receipt of a
statutory notice, payment providers would have had 5 days to suspend
payment services involving U.S. customers and the offending foreign
site, while advertisers would have had 5 days to stop advertising on
the site, to stop making ads on behalf of the site, and to cease pay-
ments in either direction.112
The notice required by SOPA, among other details, had to iden-
tify the offending site either by domain name or Internet Protocol ad-
dress.113 The rightholder also had to include in the notice “specific
facts” to support its claim that the site was dedicated to the theft of
U.S. property and to “clearly show” that failure to take timely action
would result in immediate and irreparable injury.114 These require-
ments, had they been enacted into law and rigorously enforced by the
courts, might have been difficult for rightholders to meet outside of the
most blatant of infringers. For example, they are more demanding
than the notice requirements under section 512 of the DMCA. On the
other hand, especially in the case of payment sites, responding to a
valid notice would likely require severing all transactional relations
with the site, even those transactions that are not directed at U.S.
users or that are perhaps not infringing at all. This could have re-
sulted in correction measures highly disproportional to the wrong – for
example, where an entire site is shut down but only a single page con-
tains infringing materials.115
Lital Helman and Gideon Parchomovsky have recently pro-
posed a new approach to liability for web hosts.116 Under their propo-
sal, hosts would be immune from liability provided they make use of
the best filtering technology available on the market. They make a
strong case that this approach would reduce costs and result in more
rapid improvements in filtering technologies. The argument applies
110 Id. § 103(a)(1).
111 Id. § 103(b).
112 Id. § 103(b)(1)-(2).
113 Id. § 103(b)(4)(A)(ii).
114 Id. § 103(b)(4)(A)(iii).
115 Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum & David Ewen, Catch Me if You Can: An Analysis of
New Enforcement Measures and Proposed Legislation To Combat the Sale of Coun-
terfeit Products on the Internet, 32 PACE L. REV. 567, 638 (2012).
116 Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Stan-
dard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1194 (2011).
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primarily only to web hosts, however, which leaves the problem open
for a number of other players.117
V. WHY ARE WE DRAFTING PRIVATE PARTIES INTO THE
COPYRIGHT POLICE FORCE?
At a basic level, these judicial and legislative efforts to enlist
the assistance of third parties to enforce the copyright and other intel-
lectual property rights held by others seems a bit strange. We do not
demand that neighboring landowners assist one another in preventing
trespass, and even patent law enforcement is left largely, if not wholly,
in the hands of the patent holder. Intuitively, we know that digital
technologies have somehow changed the nature of the game, especially
in copyright, but we have yet to develop a coherent theory that speci-
fies where the various lines should be drawn. We know that copying
and worldwide distribution is easier, cheaper, and faster than was pos-
sible in the analog world, so the question is, or should be, how this
easier, cheaper, and faster copying changes our feelings concerning
who should be responsible for what in enforcing the private intellec-
tual property rights held by content owners.
As the Netcom case shows, traditional principles of secondary
liability do bring with them some added responsibilities, which is why
the battle has been raging over what is meant by “actual knowledge” of
the infringement to which one is accused of contributing. That ap-
proach seems unproblematic in cases like bulletin boards, at least once
the operator of the service has actual notice of a specific infringing
item. It becomes more problematic in cases like Visa International,
where the paying financial institution has actual knowledge of the in-
fringing activity in general and, at least arguably, makes a material
contribution in effecting the money transfer between purchaser and
infringer. However, as would be the case under SOPA, stopping all
payments to the allegedly infringing site runs the risk of cutting off all
transactions with that site, not just those that are the subject of the
specific infringement complaint.
Further, traditional secondary liability does not generally
reach at all the other objects of SOPA’s regulation, namely, advertis-
ers. It is difficult to argue that advertisers on a site that contains or
offers infringing material make a material contribution to the infringe-
117 These authors concede that applying their approach to conduit ISPs is consid-
erably more complicated, as its application would involve inspecting huge amounts
of internet traffic in real time and the absence of transparency, as a result of which
the ISPs would be tempted to sacrifice user interests in the face of demands from
rightowners. Id. at 1242. The authors do not attempt to apply their model to third
parties like payment providers or web advertisers, but it seems that similar objec-
tions would apply in those realms, as well.
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ment, or that they are in a position to control the actions of the in-
fringer. So, we have moved from a relatively straightforward
secondary liability problem for the web host in Netcom to giving power
to intellectual property rightholders under SOPA to effect a change in
otherwise entirely legal business relations between an advertiser and
an allegedly infringing website. Had SOPA been enacted but proved
with time to be less effective than hoped, it would be surprising if we
did not hear demands for yet greater participation by third parties in
copyright enforcement.
Many arguments against regulating, or at least against over-
regulating, ISPs and other third parties with respect to copyright in-
fringement on the Internet fall into traditional balancing: content
owner interest in intellectual property rights enforcement versus user
interests in matters like privacy, free expression, loss of rights only
after a hearing by an impartial judge, and transparency in regulatory
processes. Section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act and the EU E-Com-
merce Directive clearly represent a set of policy compromises among
various players in the light of these policy considerations, as, indeed,
did SOPA and ACTA. The question still remains, however, why we are
involved in this kind of policy balancing at all: How did it become ac-
cepted that private third parties should be part of the copyright en-
forcement scheme?
It seems to come down to that favorite weasel word of the law,
reasonableness. We have long demanded that people take reasonable
care so that their otherwise legal actions do not harm others. The
Netcom court itself looked to whether the defendant acted reasonably
in response to the notice of infringing activity in determining whether
the defendant made a material contribution to the infringement. While
“acting reasonably” and “material contribution” do not have an obvious
logical connection, the infringer in Netcom was using Netcom’s facili-
ties, at least arguably, with Netcom’s knowledge. Requiring the ISP to
“act reasonably” seemed like a perfectly natural extension of tradi-
tional concepts of contributory infringement. However, by what legal
theory do we extend this reasoning to Internet advertisers as SOPA
would have done?  And does it make sense to extend it to credit card
companies who participate in the payment transaction, as Judge
Kozinsky would have done in the Visa case? Perhaps a general rule is
evolving in which people simply must do what is reasonable when they
have a degree of knowledge of an illegal act and are in a position to
stop it. If we limit this new “rule” to intellectual property infringe-
ment, the question is, why only intellectual property rights? If we are
expanding the obligations of people more generally, the question is,
why are we not having a fuller discussion of this radical change in our
legal thinking?

